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Boy Scouts of America v. Dale:
The "Gay Rights Activist" as
Constitutional Pariah
by
Arthur S. Leonard
An openly gay man so
constantly
and
inescapably
broadcasts a message about the
moral and social acceptability of
homosexuality that an organization
that does not want to broadcast
such a message is entitled to deny
him
membership,
even
if
applicable state law forbids
discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.'
By so seemingly 2 holding, the
Supreme Court has added fuel to
the long-running debate about
whether it is meaningful to speak
of a distinction between status and
conduct when analyzing legal
issues raised by human sexuality.
The debate arises most centrally in
the context of military service, where statute and
regulations impute to those with a homosexual orientation
the propensity to engage in conduct prohibited by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.3 The Court, however,
has studiously avoided taking any cases challenging the
military regulations, thus delaying its entry into the
debate.4 With its June 28, 2000 ruling in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, a majority of the Court apparently lines
up with those who argue that such a distinction is artificial

and makes no sense in the real world
outside the courtroom - at least in
the case of a man who is
characterized
as an
"avowed5
homosexual and gay rights activist."
The Court's holding on this
point in Dale, while potentially
momentous in its theoretical impact,
is barely articulated, much less
discussed and analyzed in any depth
by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist's opinion, which is mainly
concerned with refuting the New
Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion
that expressing disapproval of
homosexuality is not an essential
expressive function of the Boy
Scouts of America. 6 The opinion
particularizes the holding to plaintiff
James Dale, an "avowed homosexual and gay rights
activist, ' 7 and disavows adopting a general rule "that an
expressive association can erect a shield against
antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere
acceptance of a member from a particular group would
impair its message." 8 Nonetheless, the opinion does not
provide a theoretical basis for determining those gay
people who are now to be considered second-class
citizens where antidiscrimination laws are concerned.
This lack of definition raises the possibility of any openly
homosexual person being treated as a public
accommodations pariah so long as the organization can
assert a credible expressive association interest that
regards homosexuality as morally unacceptable.

The Supreme Court
has added fuel to the
long-running debate
about whether it is
meaningful to speak of
a distinction between
status and conduct
when analyzing legal
issues raised by human
sexuality.

Arthur S. Leonard is a professor at New York Law School.
The writer acknowledges support of this work through a
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I.

BACKGROUND: THE DALE CASE
James Dale joined the Cub Scouts as an eight-yearold and advanced through the ranks of scouting to become
an Eagle Scout, the highest rank, before graduating from
the program at age eighteen. His record in the Scouts was
exemplary. He then applied to become an adult member
and was appointed assistant scoutmaster for Troop 73.
Meanwhile, as a student at Rutgers University, Dale
acknowledged his gay identity and joined the Rutgers
University Lesbian/Gay Alliance, becoming its copresident and campus spokesperson.
After a local
newspaper reported remarks Dale made at a seminar on
the psychological and health needs of gay youth in July
1990, he received a letter from Monmouth Council Scout
Executive James Kay revoking his membership. When
Dale pressed for an explanation, he was told that the Boy
Scouts "specifically forbid membership to homosexuals." 9
But Dale could have looked high and low in all the
Scout literature available to him at the time without
discovering any such prohibition. Homosexuality was not
mentioned in the Scout Oath or Law, nor in the Boy
Scouts Handbook or any other official publication of the
organization.
Scout leaders were instructed by the
organization to avoid discussing issues of sexuality and to
refer questions from the boys about sex to their parents,
teachers, religious counselors, or others with relevant
expertise. Although an internal memorandum from 1978
reflected an understanding at the highest national level of
Scouting that it was undesirable to have openly gay
members, this view was never formalized in an "official"
policy statement. 1
Dale tried to appeal the revocation of his
membership internally without success. After New Jersey
enacted a law forbidding discrimination in places of
public accommodation," Dale filed suit against the Boy
Scouts in state court in 1992, seeking reinstatement as an
adult member and leader. A trial judge granted summary
judgment to the defendant, finding that the Boy Scouts of
America is not a "place of public accommodation" and,
alternatively, that the Boy Scouts would have the privilege
to exclude Dale from membership under the First
Amendment's protection for expressive association.12 The
Appellate Division reversed on both counts, finding the
Scouts analogous to Little League Baseball, which had
previously been held to be covered by the law, and finding
as well that reinstating Dale would place no burden on the
Scouts' right to expressive association. The court found
that the Scouts had failed to show that disapproval of
homosexuality was part of its expressive function.' 3 In
unanimously affirming this ruling, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reviewed an extensive summary judgment
record, finding little support for the Boy Scouts' assertion
that opposition to homosexuality was an intrinsic feature

of its expressive association that would be significantly
burdened if they were required to accept Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster. 14
The Supreme Court reversed, five votes to four. 5
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court
proclaimed deference towards the Boy Scouts' contention
that its expressive association included disapproval of
homosexuality, and it deferred as well to the Scouts'
contention that its ability to communicate such
disapproval would be significantly burdened by having
Dale as an adult member.' 6 Rehnquist treated the issue as
whether the leadership of the Boy Scouts of America
sincerely disapproved of homosexuality and wished to
avoid communicating any approval of homosexuality to
its members, rather than whether the organization had ever
formally adopted a program of explicitly sending its
members a message of disapproval of homosexuality or
whether it had been formed, in the first place, to propagate
Thus, the Court implicitly
such a message.
conceptualized the case as being about a nongovernmental organization's right not to be required to
appear to endorse a particular viewpoint about
homosexuality.
Rehnquist treated as obvious the proposition that
having Dale as an adult member would "surely interfere
with the Boy Scouts' choice not to propound a point of
view contrary to its beliefs"'17 and opined that the Boy
Scouts is entitled to judicial deference on that point.
Rehnquist then asserted that the "state interests embodied
in New Jersey's public accommodations law do not justify
such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to
freedom of expressive association,"' 8 without sparing
even a sentence to discuss what New Jersey's interests
might be or how the weights should be calculated in this
balancing test.19 Rehnquist concluded with a disclaimer
that the Court was not expressing any view about whether
the Boy Scouts' "teachings with respect to homosexual
conduct are right or wrong. ,,20 Since the Boy Scouts has
never adopted a formal, published policy instructing its
members about homosexuality, one presumes that
Rehnquist's reference to the organization's "teachings
with respect to homosexual conduct" (a phrase apparently
lifted from the Boy Scouts' briefs) refers solely to its
internal memoranda and statements made during
litigation, as well as whatever conclusion about
homosexuality its members might draw from the
organization's studied silence on the topic combined with
the more generalized conventional morality taught in its
publications.
Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens turned to the
Court's precedents concerning the clash between
associational freedom and state antidiscrimination laws,2 '
observing that prior to Dale, the Court had never accepted
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a First Amendment defense by a discriminatory
membership organization, because the Court had always
found that the defendant organizations were not organized
for the purpose of discriminating or advocating
discrimination.22 Applying similar analysis of the record
in this case, Stevens found no support for the contention
that the Boy Scouts was organized for the purpose of
discriminating against homosexuals or the purpose of
"teaching" any particular view about homosexuality to its
members.
Describing as "astounding" the Court's
expressed willingness to defer to the Boy Scouts in
deciding both the organization's expressive associational
function and the degree of burden the antidiscrimination
law would impose on that function,23 Stevens asserted that
the only way to avoid sham claims of associational
freedom masquerading for pure discrimination would be
to conduct an independent scrutiny of the evidence of
what the Scouts had actually said and done prior to the
litigation. Extracting a general teaching from the Court's
prior expressive association cases about membership
organizations, Stevens summarized the holdings as
follows:
The relevant question is whether the mere
inclusion of the person at issue would "impose
any serious burden," "affect in any significant
way," or be "a substantial restraint upon" the
organization's "shared goals," "basic goals," or
"collective effort to foster beliefs." 24
Stevens concluded that there was no evidence in the
record to show that the Boy Scouts had any sort of shared
goal, basic goal, or collective effort to foster beliefs with
respect to homosexuality. Indeed, the organization had
shied away from making any public statements on the
subject, articulating a public position only in response to
litigation and instructing its members to avoid discussion
of the issue. Stevens also noted that the documentation of
internal discussion on the issue was scarce and selfcontradictory. The 1978 internal memorandum upon
which the organization heavily relied actually stated that
(at that time) no state had outlawed discrimination against
homosexuals, but that if such legislation was adopted the
organization would have to reconsider its membership
policies.25 The organization first publicly proposed that
the Scout Oath and Scout Law mandates that members be
"morally straight" and pursue a "clean" life could be
interpreted as condemning homosexuality only after
26
litigants attacked the exclusionary membership policy.
In a more recent statement, the organization appeared to
back away from the contention that homosexuals are not
"morally straight' or "clean" by instead contending that
allowing openly gay adults to serve as troop leaders would
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conflict with the expectations of the parents of youthful
Scout members. 27
Stevens' arguments, however, seem to respond more
to Rehnquist's carelessly worded opinion than to the
actual concept of the case that the majority appears to
have adopted: not that the Scouts wish to send a particular
message about homosexuality to its members, but rather
that the Scouts wish to avoid sending a particular message
to its members. As Rehnquist wrote, "Dale's presence in
the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the
organization to send a message, both to the youth
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
28
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
Thus, for the majority, the issue was not so much that
Dale's presence would conflict with a message that the
Scouts were already sending, but rather that it would
"force" the organization to send a message with which its
leadership disagreed. That is why Rehnquist was more
concerned with the "sincerity" of the organization's
"beliefs" about homosexuality than with whether the
organization had, in fact, been sending a clear message of
those beliefs to its members and the general public.
H.

SENDINGA MESSAGE: THE OPENLY GAY
MAN AS A POLITICAL BANNER
The Court's ruling depends on the proposition that
James Dale, by being both openly gay and, in Rehnquist's
description, a "gay rights activist," automatically radiates
a message, such that every organization with which he is
associated is thereby adopting and sending a message of
approval of homosexuality both to its members and to the
public at large.
Justice Stevens suggests that this
proposition, when expanded to the entire adult
membership of Scouting, is "mind boggling," 29 not least
because the Boy Scouts is a diverse organization with
millions of members who undoubtedly hold a wide variety
of views on many controversial issues on which the Boy
Scouts' leaders would rather not take a public position.
Many of these members undoubtedly express those views
publicly outside of their Scouting activities, as Dale had
done. Surely, an organization that seeks members from all
religious faiths would rather avoid being identified as a
"Zionist" organization, but would that justify the Boy
Scouts in refusing to allow an adult who is an active,
outspoken Zionist to be a Scoutmaster?
In support of his conclusion that reinstatement of
Dale would force an unwanted message on the Boy
Scouts, Rehnquist relied on the Court's unanimous 1995
decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.30 The Court held there
that the First Amendment right of freedom of speech
protected the organizers of a Boston parade from being
forced to include in the line of march a gay organization
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carrying a banner proclaiming its identity. According to
the Hurley opinion, the organizers of the parade did not
seek to exclude gay people from marching-not even
openly gay people-but rather did not want to include an
organization carrying a banner proclaiming gay identity,
because that would interpolate an unwanted gay rights
message into the overall message of the parade. The
Court characterized a parade as an inherently expressive
activity and held that the parade organizers had the right
to determine what the parade expressed through the signs,
banners, and slogans exhibited by the marchers.3'
But by relying on Hurley to justify the exclusion of
Dale from the Scouts, the Court conflates the banner with
the person who holds it. Unless Dale wears a sign
proclaiming his sexual orientation or constantly speaks
about it while undertaking his duties as an assistant
scoutmaster, he is not engaged in the kind of conduct for
which the Gay Irish group was fighting in Hurley: to
actively project their message to the public using the
vehicle of a parade organized by somebody else.32 As
Justice Stevens observed in dissent:
Dale's inclusion in the Boy Scouts is nothing
like the case in Hurley. His participation sends
no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the
world. Unlike GLIB [the Gay Irish group in
Boston], Dale did not carry a banner or a sign;
he did not distribute any fact sheet; and he
expressed no intent to send any message. If
there is any kind of message being sent, then, it
is by the mere act of joining the Boy Scouts.
Such an act does not constitute an instance 33of
symbolic speech under the First Amendment.
Dale's battle is not to convert the Boy Scouts into a
gay rights organization. It is merely to participate as an
individual in the Boy Scouts, on the same basis on which
any other adult with his background of successful youth
participation would normally be entitled to participate,
especially at a time when the supply of qualified adult
leaders for Scout troops is so tight that troops have
disbanded for lack of leadership. 34 As Justice Stevens
observed, there was no indication that Dale had ever tried
to use his assistant scoutmaster position to convey a gay
rights message. Indeed, until an anonymous person sent
the newspaper clipping to the Monmouth Council Scout
Executive, describing Dale's participation in the seminar
on gay youth, nobody in the Scouts organization even
knew that Dale was gay.35
Whereas the policy on military service conflates
status and conduct by adopting the presumption that
"homosexuals" have a "propensity" to "engage in
homosexual conduct," the Boy Scouts' argument in Dale

advances the proposition that people who are openly
homosexual are, whether consciously or not, constantly
propagandizing for approval of homosexuality by their
mere presence. Once again, status and conduct are
conflated to justify treating people differently on account
of their sexual orientation. Another strong resemblance
between the Scouts and the military policies is the
apparent acceptance that there will be many
"homosexuals" who are fully acceptable members of both
organizations without being open about their sexual
orientation. In this sense, then, the conflation is not
between status and conduct, but rather between "known
status" and conduct.
One wonders why the women who sought
membership in all-male business clubs were not found to
have projected any sort of message by their "forced"
inclusion pursuant to state public accommodations laws.
After all, the presence of a woman in a formerly all-male
sanctum communicates its own message about the rights
of women to participate in the economic and social life of
the community. It also says that it is acceptable for
women to participate in that sphere-hardly a noncontroversial position at the time these cases were
litigated, and still controversial, to judge by the continuing
under-representation of women in positions of business
leadership. Why would it have been no less valid for the
U.S. Jaycees to argue that their core purpose of advancing
the business interests of young men was diluted and
contradicted, and that the organization was forced to
convey an additional message about the validity of
business careers for women? The Court's response was to
say that, after it had examined the articulated goals and
policies of the Jaycees, it could not find that the
organization had a shared purpose that would be
contradicted by including women as members, while the
state had a compelling interest in ensuring the inclusion of
women in 3important
private institutions in the business
6
community.
In Dale, the Court abandoned its requirement that
the discriminatory organization prove that it has a shared
goal that would be burdened by including a person such as
Dale, precisely because the Court saw Dale, unlike a
(presumably heterosexual) woman, as a banner
proclaiming Gay Pride wherever he is. 37 But a person is
not a banner and does not speak until he speaks. Of
course, such conflation by the Court may be
understandable in a decision that finds that the Boy Scouts
are speaking a negative message about homosexuality
when they are not speaking at all!
III. EXCLUSION FROM THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The party that files the petition for certiorariframes
the questions to be presented to the Court. And the Court,
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of course, is limited to deciding questions of federal law.
These two factors worked together to practically exclude
from the case one of its most important issues: the very
public nature of the Boy Scouts of America.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, which had to
confront the issue of whether the organization is a "place
of public accommodation" under state law before it had
any need to deal with the expressive association claim,
necessarily gave extensive consideration to the nature of
the organization and how it related to the surrounding
community. After reviewing the detailed record on the
question, that court had no problem reaching the
conclusion that the Boy Scouts was an active, nonexclusionary participant in the life of the communities
where its troops functioned.
Indeed, the Scouts
organization
actively involved
religious,
civic,
educational, and governmental units in activities as
sponsors for individual troops. 38 As the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated:
In New Jersey, for example, public schools and
school-affiliated groups sponsor close to 500
scouting units, comprising approximately onefifth of the chartering organizations in the
State. Other governmental entities, such as law
enforcement agencies, fire departments, city
governments, and the military, sponsor
approximately 250 scouting units in New
Jersey.39
Sponsorship includes the duty to secure facilities and find
adult leadership, thus implicating the sponsoring
organization in whatever policies the Scouts adopt
regarding qualifications for leadership.
These facts
persuaded the New Jersey Supreme Court that the Scouts
were a place of public accommodation under state law.
That question, having been settled definitively by the
state's highest court, could not be re-examined by the
United States Supreme Court. This meant, unfortunately,
that the Supreme Court apparently discounted how
relevant the facts underlying the public accommodations
determination could be to the question of expressive
association. For the right of a "private organization" to
dictate the terms of its expressive association must
necessarily accommodate the constitutional and statutory
non-discrimination requirements of the public entities with
which its activities become intertwined. The public
schools of New Jersey are prohibited from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation in the activities they
conduct for students and other participants, as a matter of
equal protection of the laws as well as in compliance with
the state's law against sexual orientation discrimination.
Similarly, police and fire departments are bound by such
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nondiscrimination requirements, producing the anomaly
under the Supreme Court's decision that an openly gay
police officer who wishes to volunteer as an adult leader
for the Boy Scout troop sponsored by the police
department, which may actually be holding its meetings at
the police station, needs be told that he is to be excluded
from an activity otherwise made available to all other
members of the department. This would be in clear
violation of constitutional and statutory policies governing
the operation of the police department.
Apart from a passing mention (in Justice Stevens'
dissent4 °) of how the non-discrimination prohibitions
imposed on sponsoring organizations would thus
undermine the "role model" theory espoused by the Boy
Scouts, there is no other mention in the majority or
dissenting opinions of the more fundamental question:
How can an organization that recruits its members through
public schools, frequently meets in public facilities on a
privileged basis, and uses public entities as "sponsors" of
its activities, maintain the status of a purely private
expressive association? Does the Ku Klux Klan have a
right to exclude African-Americans from membership?
Of course. Would it continue to have that right if its local
units were officially sponsored by local police and fire
departments, and its meetings were held in police and fire
stations? Would a public school be implicated in the
establishment of religion if it rented its auditorium for the
holding of a religious service? Undoubtedly so. Then is
it not equally implicated in discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation if it sponsors a Boy Scout troop, which
holds meetings in the school auditorium, and if it enforces
the Boy Scout policy by acquiescing in the exclusion of
openly gay students or adult volunteers?
In short, there is a strong basis for arguing that the
Boy Scouts should not be considered a purely "private
organization," but rather an organization whose very
existence and function are so intertwined with the
government as to take on many of the attributes of state
action, thus imposing on it the obligations of equal
protection and non-discrimination that restrict the policies
of governmental entities. Because of the way this
controversy came to the Court, unfortunately, the question
of the organization's public nature seems to have
been
41
skirted, when it should instead have been central.
By the same token, however, the Court's failure to
note or address this issue leaves open what may turn into
Round Two of the litigation struggle over the Boy Scouts'
policy. It is one thing for an individual such as James
Dale to ask the government to force a "private"
organization to take him as a member. It is quite another
for Dale to ask the state of New Jersey, its public schools,
and police and fire departments to disengage themselves
from discriminatory policies that they are themselves
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forbidden to adopt. The state may not be able to order a
purely private organization to take as a member one
whose public advocacy is anathema to that organization's
views, but the state must refuse sponsorship of an
organization whose views are anathema to the state's
articulated public policies.42 As Chief Justice Warren
Burger wrote in a different context, "Private biases may
the law cannot,
be outside the reach of the law, but
'43
IV. CONCLUSION

military service by gay people, adopted as a Congressional
factual finding that "homosexuals" have a propensity to engage
in certain sexual conduct and that such conduct will have the
effect of disrupting "unit cohesion" to the detriment of the
national defense. Thus, "homosexuals" must be excluded from
the military forces in order to prevent this disruption to unit
cohesion. A military member can avoid discharge by proving
that she does not have a propensity to engage in "homosexual
conduct" - i.e., is not a "homosexual" within the meaning of the
statute. See generally, JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER's
GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999).

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale presented the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to explore the limits

4

directly or indirectly, give them effect.

of associational freedom as a defense raised by the
nation's largest youth organization, which is heavily
engaged in the public sphere and plays a central role in the
lives of millions of American boys. While the Court
issued a ruling on the merits of the claim, it failed to
undertake the kind of open, conscious exploration of
many important issues embedded in the case that could
have made an important contribution to the struggle by
sexual minorities for equal status in American society. 44
The resulting decision, "astounding" as it may be to
dissenting Justice Stevens, may provide those who study
sexual orientation law yet another example of the "gay
exception" to the U.S. Constitution.45 One hopes that the
peculiar methodology the majority employed in reaching
key factual findings is confined to such an exception and
is not enlarged by lower courts to undermine the salutary
workings of public accommodation laws in other contexts.
But that such a "gay exception" exists is itself astounding,
in light of the Court's ruling in Romer v. Evans,46 which
seemingly held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
treating gay people as constitutional pariahs.

See Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 794 (1999); Thore v.
United States Dep't of Def., dismissed, 139 F.3d 893 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 371 (1998); Selland v. Perry, 100
F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1691 (1997);
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 358 (1996); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 655 (1992). In all these cases,
the circuit courts of appeals rejected constitutional challenges to
the military policy of discharging gay personnel and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
5

120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2000). Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist so characterizes Dale in his opinion for the Court,
commenting that "Dale, by his own admission, is one of a group
of gay Scouts who have 'become leaders in their community and
are open and honest about their sexual orientation."' Id. at 2454.
6

See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am. 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999).

7

120 S.Ct. at 2454. See also supra note 5.
Id. at 2453.

NOTES
The facts are taken from the reported appellate decisions in
the case. See id. at 2449; Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d
at 1204-05; Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 27576 (N.J. App. Div. 1998). Ironically, Monmouth Council's Boy
Scout Troop 73 no longer exists. Among the reasons given for
its dissolution several years ago was a shortage of adult leaders.
Jeffrey Gold, Troop Is Gone, But Scouts Cheer Court Ruling,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, July 2, 2000, at 8A.
9

This is, of course, a vastly oversimplified statement of the
holding in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446

(2000), but vastly oversimplifying holdings of Supreme Court
cases is a common practice in the world of constitutional
adjudication.
I use the word "seemingly" deliberately, as it is possible to
read the majority decision as being much narrower than the
2

foregoing formulation.

," See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d at 1200-04.

I

H New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to
-49 (amended in 1991 to add "sexual orientation" to the
categories of prohibited discrimination).

The Uniform Code of Military Justice 10 U.S.C. § 925 art.
125 (1956) prohibits members of the military from engaging in
anal or oral sex under any circumstances and is not specifically

targeted at same-sex conduct. The statute on military service by
"homosexuals," 10 U.S.C. § 654, passed by Congress in 1993 in
response to President Clinton's proposal to end the ban on

,2 The Superior Court's decision is not published, but is
described in varying degrees of detail in the subsequent opinions
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in the case. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. CL at
2450; Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d at 1205-06; and
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d at 277.
11 See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am. 706 A.2d at 288.
"

See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d at 1221-22.

,1 Joining Rehnquist in the majority were Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence
Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented in an opinion
joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer. Justice Souter wrote a separate dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.
"The Boy Scouts asserts that it 'teaches that homosexual
conduct is not morally straight,' Brief for Petitioners 39, and
that it does 'not want to promote homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior,' Reply Brief for Petitioners 5. We
accept the Boy Scouts' assertion. We need not inquire further to
determine the nature of the Boy Scouts' expression with respect
to homosexuality." Rehnquist went on to say that the Court
would only look at the written evidence on this point as
"instructive, if only on the question of the sincerity of the
professed beliefs." 120 S.Ct. at 2453. As to the question of
whether reinstating Dale would "significantly burden" the
Scouts' expressive association rights, Rehnquist said, "As we
give deference to an association's assertions regarding the
nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an
association's view of what would impair its expression." Id.
"

Id. at 2469. The quoted passages were drawn by Justice
Stevens from statements by the Court in Jaycees, Rotary Club,
Club Ass'n, and NAACP. See supra note 21.
24

See id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The internal letter
is framed in question and answer format. Responding to the
question of whether an openly gay person should be terminated
from membership, it states: "Yes, in the absence of any law to
the contrary. At the present time we are unaware of any statute
or ordinance in the United States which prohibits discrimination
against individual's employment upon the basis of
homosexuality. In the event that such a law was applicable, it
would be necessary for the Boy Scouts of America to obey it...
It is our position, however, that homosexuality and
professional or non-professional employment in Scouting are
not appropriate."
By the time Dale's membership was
terminated, several states and numerous municipalities had
adopted such laws.
25

26

Id. at 2463-64 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2464-65 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2454.
Id. at 2476 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
515 U.S. 557 (1995).

3'

120 S. Ct. at 2474-76 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (discussing the

Hurley decision).
1

Id. at 2454.

Is

Id. at 2457.

This writer felt part of a definite minority in the gay
community in supporting the Court's decision in Hurley. This
support stemmed from his own feelings of disquiet while
attending Gay Pride marches in New York City during the
1980s and observing the contingent of the "Workers World
Party," with their sound truck blasting socialist slogans of little
relevance to Gay Pride. The organizers of the Gay Pride march,
in pursuing a philosophy of inclusion of all assertedly gaysupportive organizations, allowed the Workers World Party
contingent to march, but this writer was taken aback at the
inclusion of a group communicating a" message almost totally
dissociated from the message that the parade organizers were
presumably striving to project. In the same light, this writer
advised the Rabbi of New York's gay synagogue not to file a
discrimination complaint when the organizers of the annual
Salute to Israel parade refused to allow the gay synagogue to
march under its own banner in the parade. This advice was
followed, and several years after the initial controversy, a new
generation of parade organizers invited the gay synagogue to
participate - under its own banner.
n

,9 Rehnquist conceded that in prior cases the Court had
acknowledged a compelling interest of states to prevent
discrimination against women in places of public
accommodation. Id. at 2456. He failed, however, to say how
significant New Jersey's interest might be in prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination by the Boy Scouts of America.
Id. at 2458.
21

See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487

U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
n
23Id.

120 S.Ct. at 2466-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

at 2471.
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120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'
Gold, supra note 9. This article reports that Dale's own
troop was dissolved after his expulsion for, among other things,
lack of adult leadership.
3,

120 S. Ct. at 2472-73, 2475 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626-28
(1984).
1

Justice Stevens makes this point when he observes:
The only apparent explanation for the majority's
holding, then, is that homosexuals are simply so
different from the rest of society that their presence
alone - unlike any other individual's - should be singled
out for special First Amendment treatment. Under the
majority's reasoning, an openly gay male is irreversibly
affixed with the label 'homosexual.' That label, even
though unseen, communicated a message that permits
his exclusion wherever he goes. His openness is the
sole and sufficient justification for his ostracism.
Though unintended, reliance on such a justification is
tantamount to a constitutionally prescribed symbol of
inferiority.

120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens
noted that counsel for the Boy Scouts actually contended
during oral argument that Dale "put a banner around his
neck when he ...got himself into the newspaper....
He created a reputation .... He can't take that banner
off." Id. (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 25).
s

734 A.2d at 1200-04.

,9 Id. at 1201.
40

1

120 S.Ct. at 2477 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

The issue was raised at oral argument, but was never
addressed in the Court's opinion. See Official Transcript, 2000
WL 489419, *13-15. For an example of this argument in a
different context, see Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979), in which
the court concluded that the equal protection requirements of the
California constitution could be imposed on the defendant, a
private, for-profit company, because it is a heavily-regulated
public utility whose employment policies are a matter of public
concern. Consequently, the employer had a constitutional
obligation not to engage in categorical discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. For a more recent example, see
Dunayer v. Adults & Children with Learning & Developmental

Disabilities, Inc., QDS:03762476 (E.D.N.Y., Wexler, J.),
published in the N.Y. L.J., May 26, 2000 at 36, col.1. District
Judge Wexler approved a magistrate's report recommending that
a sexual orientation discrimination plaintiff be allowed to amend
her complaint to add an equal protection claim against her
private sector employer, a social-welfare agency largely funded
by the state and operating under close state regulation.
42 This process is already starting. U.S. Representative Lynn
Woolsey filed legislation to repeal the federal charter of the Boy
Scouts of America, stating, "We're not saying [the Boy Scouts
is] bad.... We're saying intolerance is bad, and I don't see any
reason why the federal government should be supporting it."
Scouts' Charter May Be Pulled, ASSOCIATED PRESs, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, July 19, 2000, at 3A. In New York City, the
Queens Lesbian and Gay Pride Committee sent a letter to
Schools Chancellor Harold Levy, asking that the public school
system live up to its non-discrimination policy by ending its
relationship with the Boy Scouts. Marilyn Anderson, Gay and
Lesbian Group Asks Boardto Shun Boy Scouts, NEWSDAY, July
19, 2000, at A16. In Tucson, Arizona, a city with an ordinance
banning sexual orientation discrimination, a local newspaper
reported that the city's Advisory Commission on Gay, Lesbian,
Bisexual and Transgender Issues was meeting to consider
recommending that the local government discontinue its funding
of local Boy Scouts activities and the newspaper editorialized in
support of such a recommendation. Editorial, Our Opinion: No
Tax Dollars for Groups that Discriminate, THE TUCSON
CITIZEN, July 17, 2000. The United Way of Southeastern New
England, a major financial supporter of Boy Scouts activities,
informed the Rhode Island chapter of the Boy Scouts that if it
did not formally rescind the anti-gay policy by December 2000,
United Way's financial support would not be renewed for the
next fiscal year. (Such support during the current fiscal year
amounted to $200,000.) The United Way sent letters to 65
organizations on its grant recipient list informing them that the
United Way board had adopted a resolution not to provide
funding to any organization that has a policy of discriminating
in its membership or activities. Jonathan Saltzman, United Way
to Cut Off Groups that Discriminate, PROVIDENCE JOURNALBULLETIN, July 19, 2000, at IA.
'3 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that
state court may not take account of societal biases against
racially-mixed marriages in deciding on award of child custody).
" For example, the Court, while disclaiming any necessary
agreement with the Boy Scouts of America's concerns about the
impact of allowing an openly gay man to serve as a scoutmaster,
held that it must defer to those concerns if it found them to be
sincerely held. 120 S.Ct. at 2453-54. However, the Court never
articulated in its opinion what those concerns might be and
whether they had any general validity as a matter of fact. At oral
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argument, counsel for the Boy Scouts denied that the
organization's policy was motivated by fears that gay
scoutmasters would molest their adolescent charges, see Official
Transcript, 2000 WL 489419, *9-10. Thus, the policy seems to
be motivated by a "role model" theory, suggesting that the
Scouts' leaders believe that having openly gay members and
leaders will cause some undetermined number of otherwise
heterosexual youths to take up homosexual practices and
identities. This brief comment is not the place for an extended
treatment of the relevant social science evidence discrediting the
role model theory of human sexuality, but the Court could have
paid some attention to the question whether the unsubstantiated
fears sincerely held by the leaders of an organization should be
allowed to trump a validly-enacted state law banning categorical
discrimination.
Perhaps the most blatant example of the "gay exception" to
the Constitution is Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
which was doctrinally discordant with the Court's sexual
privacy caselaw at the time of the decision.
45

517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a state may not treat
a specific class of citizens, gay people, as a "stranger" to its
laws).
"
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